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ARTICLES
THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION:
FACING THE CHALLENGES OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN POST-APARTHEID
SOUTH AFRICA
Christine Mary Venter*
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over the role, content and scope of customary law in a post-apartheid
South Africa can, in some respects, be viewed as a microcosm of the debate over cul-
tural relativism. However, certain historical, practical, and contextual issues peculiar to
the post-apartheid South African situation render the debate even more challenging and
contentious. This paper will focus on identifying several of the areas and provisions of
customary law which discriminate against women and contrasting these practices with
the anti-discrimination clauses contained in the new South African Constitution. This
paper will then posit how the divergent interests of cultural rights may best be recon-
ciled with women's rights.
The challenge confronting the legislators and the judiciary in a new South Africa
is reconciling these apparently conflicting, but arguably equally valid, legal premises.
The challenge also involves a problem of discourse, as women's rights are often
couched in western, individual-based rights language, while cultural rights, which are
more community-based rights, do not translate well into this terminology. In deter-
mining which of these rights, if any, should be afforded primacy, questions of interna-
tional law, human rights and natural law come into play.
This article will also explore whether a commitment to natural law principles or
international norms justifies the abrogation of those customary law provisions which
are inconsistent with anti-discrimination principles. The issue of the legitimacy and
authenticity of a customary law, which has been altered in order to eliminate provi-
sions discriminatory to women, will also be canvassed.
The topics of debate raised here are important for several reasons. First, they
serve to illustrate the differences and potential conflicts between a western and non-
western approach to concepts such as rights and equality. Further, they highlight many
of the divisions within present South African society, which, if not properly addressed,
* Supervising Attorney for Notre Dame Legal Aid; Associate Professor, Notre Dame Law
School. LL.M., Notre Dame Law School, 1992; LL.B., University of Cape Town, 1985.
1. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTSTALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLmcAL DiscoURSE 115
(1991) ("An implicit anthropology-an encoded image of the human being as radically alone and
'naturally' at odds with his fellows[-]" colors our discourse and makes it difficult to "take into ac-
count the sort of groups within which human character [is] formed.").
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could impact on the future of post-apartheid South Africa both internally as well as in
the sphere of international relations.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL RIGHTS
The concept of a people having a right to their culture developed in the wake of
the French Revolution and was expanded upon in the aftermath of the two world wars.
It was also, in part, a reaction to the colonial era.2 This concept was at first often i-
dentified with a right to self-determination,3 as is evidenced by the Charter of the U-
nited Nations which emphasizes the U.N.'s commitment to the concepts of equal rights
and self-determination.4 It appears that the U.N. envisaged such rights being achieved
by "international cultural and educational cooperation," together with increased respect
for "human rights and ... fundamental freedoms."5 The implication that the rights to
self-determination and one's culture were necessary for human dignity was reflected in
the 1948 U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, which provided in part that
"[e]veryone... is entitled to realization ... of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality."6
Similarly, the' 1960 U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and Peoples affirmed that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determina-
tion; by virtue of that right they freely pursue their economic, social and cultural de-
velopment."" The Declaration further hinted at the possibility that the right to culture
included the right of a people to their particular system of law.' This right had already
been specifically recognized in the 1957 International Labor Convention No. 107.,
These sentiments were echoed and expanded upon in the 1967 International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,' and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights," which recognized the right of the individual to take part in the
cultural life of his or her particular ethnic, religious or linguistic group.
The concept of having a right to pursue one's culture, coupled as it was with an
actual or implied reference to self-determination and freedom from colonial rule, not
surprisingly, fell on fertile ground in Africa. 2 The concept was particularly appealing
2. Patrick Thornberry, Self Determination, Minorities and Human Rights: A Review of Interna-
tional Instruments, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 860, 869 (1989).
3. Id.
4. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1. 55.
5. Id. art. 55.
6. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
7. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4864 (1961).
8. Id. The Declaration provides that "all powers" should be transferred to the peoples of Trust
and Non-Self-Governing Territories "to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom." Id
This would seem to imply the power to determine their own legal system.
9. The Convention was known as the ILO Convention No. 107 Concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal populations in Independent Countries. 328
U.N.T.S. 247. Articles 7 and 7.2 refer to the right of indigenous populations to retain their customary
laws as long as such were not incompatible with the national legal system. This Convention has been
discredited somewhat due to its references to "assimilation" and integration of ethnic groups. Its re-
placement, ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries, was drafted in 1989 and also provides for the recognition of customary law in Article 8. It has
not yet entered into force.
10. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
11. Id. at 52. It should be noted that the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affords the right
to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to enjoy their own culture, profess their own religion or use
their own language. Id.
12. This is not to imply that the concept of self-determination necessarily originated in the west
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in apartheid ruled South Africa primarily because it was seen as a right to freedom
from the oppression of minority rule. By affirming the right to culture, and by linking
it to some degree with self-determination, the international community effectively
denounced the apartheid government's approach to cultural issues. 3
In 1955, the Freedom Charter of the Congress of the People sought to give ef-
fect, within a South African context, to the rights to culture that were being developed
in the international arena. 4 However, the Congress was ambivalent about whether the
right to one's culture necessarily connoted the right of each tribal group within South
Africa to self-development. Many members of the Congress believed that the unity of
a future South Africa would be jeopardized if this concept was overemphasized, be-
cause it would lead to the fragmentation of the country.
The concept of the right to culture, once rooted, was not so easily dislodged by
vague definitions and disagreements as to its boundaries. The right was reaffirmed by
the African National Congress in its "Revolutionary Programme" of 1969,6 although
this document indicated that the right of a people to their culture was to be construed
within the framework of a unitary South Africa and not to be taken as a mandate to
each tribe to pursue its own self-development in the form of secession.
IH. CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
Cultural rights have been clearly recognized by the new South African Constitu-
tion. 7 The Constitution expressly acknowledges the right of individuals to their cul-
ture" and language." It further recognizes that cultural rights include the right to ac-
knowledgment of traditional and indigenous legal systems. Thus, the role and authority
or with the U.N., merely that such concepts were publicly enunciated in the international forum
through such medium.
13. The government's approach to the cultural issue had been to render lip service to the right to
culture by instituting the policy of separate development. This had been accomplished largely by means
of the creation of tribal homelands. Since the black population had no choice in how they were allo-
cated to a particular homeland, the principle of self-determination was not adhered to. Culture was
used merely as a convenient tool to further the aims of apartheid and as a means of denying South
African citizenship to the black people. Such an approach was in marked contrast to the approach
adopted by the international community, which saw culture as affirming the dignity of a people, and
confirming their right to decide their own future. The concept, thus defined, appealed to, and was
consistent with, the communitarian basis of African society which was predicated on the approach that
the community should be responsible for all decisions affecting the group and the individual. This was
so because the interests, well-being and development of an individual were best realized through partic-
ipation in the life of the community.
14. The so-called Congress of the People was a delegation made up of various South African
groups opposed to apartheid. Together they drew up a statement of aims and beliefs which was known
as the Freedom Charter and became the credo of the African National Congress.
15. This hesitance to give too broad a definition to the right to culture is also reflected in the
new Constitution which continually emphasizes a unitary South Africa. The A.N.C. probably has good
cause to De hesitant as there are a number of parties in South Africa who have made a claim for
secession based on culture. Inkatha, the Zulu party, is one such party.
16. This document purported to describe how the provisions of the Freedom Charter should be
given effect.
17. CoNsTrrtu'oN OF THE REPUBIC OF SouTH AFRICA (Act 200 of 1993) [hereinafter S. AFR.
CONST.].
18. S. AFR. CONST. §§ 8(2), 31 ("Every person shall have the right .. to participate in the
cultural life of his or her choice.").
19. South Africa now has eleven official languages, whereas, prior to the enactment of the new Con-
stitution, it had only two: English and Afrikaans. Further, section 3 of the Constitution urges respect
for other languages and makes provisions for their use. S. AFR. CONST. § 3.
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of traditional leaders has specifically been preserved,' and black South Africans will
continue to have access to a customary law court of one form or another."
However, the framers of the new Constitution have been reticent about elaborat-
ing on the extent and application of the right to culture and the ambit of customary
law, therefore, it is unclear just what role will be played by customary law within the
new legal system." Their reticence is perhaps understandable, since an emphasis on
cultural rights might lead to tribal groups like the Zulu attempting to pursue secession.
Nonetheless, allowing cultural groups to practice customary law without any limitation
makes a mockery of the protection that the Constitution affords women.
Adherents of indigenous legal systems may claim that they have a constitutional
right to practice tribal law and customs as they see fit.' However, women have a
constitutional right to be free from unfair discrimination on the basis of gender, there-
fore cultural practices should be limited by this precept.' The framers of the Consti-
tution afforded the right to people to participate freely in the cultural life of their
choice (without limitation), yet at the same time they aimed at eliminating gender
inequities. Thus, by positing two apparently contradictory rights against each other and
prescribing that neither of these rights may be infringed upon by any law,' the archi-
tects of South Africa's new Constitution have created an inherent contradiction.
IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CULTURAL RIGHTS AND GENDER
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS
The inherent gender/cultural rights contradiction has previously manifested itself
outside of South Africa in an even more obvious form. In 1981, the right to culture
was firmly emphasized in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the
Banjul Charter),' which was drawn up by the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
The preamble to this Charter urged the signatories to take "into consideration the vir-
tues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization, which should
inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples'
rights."27 The Charter recognized the right of "all peoples" to their "economic, social
20. S. AFR. CONST. ch. 8.
21. Prior to the signing of the new Constitution, the authority of tribal courts to adjudicate cases
between members of that particular ethnic group was recognized in the former homelands. It seems
likely that these will continue to function as the new Constitution recognizes existing traditional lead-
ership. Generally, appeal may be taken from such court to the lowest civil (municipal) court. In urban
areas during the 1980s, the phenomena of "peoples courts" developed as an alternative to the main-
stream legal system. These courts were created to respond to political needs as well as social and
cultural needs, and they do not correspond exactly in structure or in their application of law to the
traditional tribal court. They do in some cases follow customary law, although they cannot be strictly
classified as "customary law" courts.
22. The Constitution provides that the customary law may not limit the rights set forth in the Bill
of Rights. S. AFR. CONST. § 33(2). While providing for the recognition and maintenance of the role of
traditional leaders and customary law, S. AFR. CONST. ch. 11, the Constitution is silent as to the pre-
cise role of customary law within the new legal system.
23. See S. AFR. CONST. § 8(2).
24. S. AFR. CONST. § 8(2).
25. S. AFR. CO NST. § 33(2).
26. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/-
LEG/67/3 Rev. 5. [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
27. Id. I interpret this phrase as indicating that the framers of the Banjul Charter considered hu-
man rights to be culturally specific to some extent. This may be borne out by Article 61 which per-
mits the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to take into consideration for purposes of
interpretation "African practices consistent with international norms on human ... rights, customs
[Vol. 21:1
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and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity."2 It further
emphasized the duty of the State in the "promotion and protection of morals and tradi-
tional values recognized by the community.""
The approach adopted by the OAU in the 1981 Charter was consistent with the
African communitarian view which emphasizes the identity of the group. 3 Further,
the premise that human rights may be culturally determined had some affinity with the
principles of cultural relativism first publicly enunciated in an international forum by
the American Anthropological Association in 1947." The Association adopted the
view that "standards and values are relative to the culture from which they derive."32
The members of the Association sought to argue that in view of this, what was held to
be a "human right in one society might be regarded as anti-social by another peo-
ple. 33
This basic premise, that all human rights may be culturally determined, was
curiously recognized on an intellectual level, yet ignored in practice in both the inter-
national and the African documents mentioned above.' This is true despite the phra-
seology contained in the preamble of the Banjul Charter, which specifically affords
recognition to this premise. If one examines the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights,
which was promulgated shortly after the Anthropological Association's brief on the
issue of the non-universality of human rights, one notes that, despite the Association's
warnings, the Declaration purports to set forth a number of rights that are traditionally
western in origin and depicts such rights as being of universal application.35 Neverthe-
less, the Declaration* acknowledges the importance of cultural diversity36 without at-
tempting to reconcile these apparently contradictory principles.
Similarly, one finds the Banjul Charter acknowledging the fact and upholding the
principle that rights are developed in accordance with the mores of one's particular
community.37 Yet at the same time the Charter adopts a number of so-called western
rights, including women's rights,38 and incorporates them verbatim,39 without appar-
ently considering whether such rights are consistent with "the historical tradition and
the values of African civilization."' All the while, African leaders profess that west-
ern legal concepts may be inappropriate for, and inconsistent with, African legal prin-
ciples.
The Banjul Charter incorporates the so-called civil and political rights that are
predicated on the western concepts of individual liberty and equality.4 ' These rights,
generally accepted as law. Id art. 61.
28. Id. art. 22.
29. Id. art. 17.
30. See Rose M'D'Sa, Human and Peoples' Rights: Distinctive Features of the African Charter,
29 J. AFR. L. 72, 74 (1985).
31. American Anthropological Association, Statement on Human Rights, 49 AM. ANTHROPoLOGiST
4 (1947).
32. Id. at 539-43.
33. Id.
34. See id.; Banjul Charter, supra note 26.
35. U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/810, at 71 (1948).
36. Id.
37. Banjul Charter, supra note 26, preamble.
38. Id. art. 18.
39. Id. arts. 2-18 (examples of so-called traditionally "western" rights).
40. Id. preamble.
41. See Banjul Charter, supra note 26.
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because of their very emphasis on individual libertarian characteristics, may be foreign
to the nature of true African law. A.J.G.M. Sanders argues that "[n]o command law-
colonial or post-independence-has been able to fundamentally transform, let alone
eradicate, what the people of Africa consider to be 'their' law."42 The true essence of
this law, Sanders goes on to assert, is its "communal/socialist nature, as distinguished
from the individualistic/capitalistic character of the superimposed European law." '43
Yet the irony of a Committee which professes its devotion to, and has sworn to up-
hold, the African tradition of law, and which voluntarily assumes a tradition apparently
contrary to this, appears to be lost on many African leaders. It is not surprising, how-
ever, that some confusion may result from such an approach.
Despite this apparent contradiction, the practice persists of incorporating western
legal concepts and terminology in post-independence African law. Such a tradition is
clearly illustrated by the number of African states which have adopted western-style
Bills of Rights.' In spite of the checkered history of many of these Bills of Rights,
South Africa has chosen to go in the same direction by incorporating a western-style
Bill of Rights into the new Constitution. The fact that transplants in law, as in medi-
cine, carry a high risk of rejection, apparently has not deterred the architects of the
new South African Constitution from pursuing this course."
V. THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH: IN FAVOR OF GENDER
EQUALITY?
The clashes in values and legal traditions that may arise when such a course is
pursued is evidenced by the new South African Constitution and the Constitutional
Principles.' Article XI of the Constitutional Principles provides for the protection of
culture and language.47 Article XII seems to acknowledge the communitarian nature
of African law by providing for "[c]ollective rights of self-determination in forming,
joining and maintaining organs of civil society, including linguistic, cultural and reli-
gious associations." Recognition of the African legal tradition is further made appar-
ent by the explicit acknowledgment in Article XIII of the "institution, status and role
of traditional leadership, according to indigenous law.' 9 This Article further provides
that "[i]ndigenous law, like common law, shall be recognized and applied by the
courts, subject to the fundamental rights contained in the Constitution."' These prin-
ciples are directly reflected in the Constitution which provides for the recognition of
42. A.J.G.M. Sanders, Towards a People's Philosophy of Law, 31 J. AFR. L. 38, 41 (1987).
43. Id.
44. The history of Bills of Rights in West Africa is discussed in B.O. NWABUAEZE, JUDICIALISM
IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA (1977). East African studies have been documented in J.P.W.B McAuslan,
The Evolution of Public Law in East Africa in the 1960s, 1970 S. AFR. PUB. L. 1, 5-19.
45. Prior to the enactment of the new Constitution some debate had been devoted to the question
of whether a post-apartheid South Africa should in fact adopt a Bill of Rights. See, for example, the
Conference organized by the Civil Rights League at the University of the Western Cape in August,
1988. See also A.J.G.M. Sanders, A Bill of Rights for South Africa, 1986 S. AFR. PUB. L. 1, 1-8.
46. These principles were agreed to by the various political parties negotiating the new Constitu-
tion. They are attached to the new Constitution as Schedule 4, and it is specifically provided that,
should the Constitution be amended, no provision may derogate from these principles. S. AFR. CONsT.
sched. 4 (Constitutional Principles).
47. S. AFR. CONST. sched. 4, art. XI.
48. S. AFR. CONST. sched. 4, art. XII.
49. S. AFR. CONST. sched. 4, art. XIII.
50. S. AFR. CONST. sched. 4, art. XI.
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traditional leaders and customary law in Chapter eleven. The Constitution moreover
refers indirectly to communal ownership of land,5 a common tradition in customary
law, and to the rights of individuals to freely participate in cultural life.
52
However, Chapter three of the Constitution, which is entitled "Fundamental
Rights," is basically a western-style Bill of Rights couched in individual rights-based
language. Since the Constitutional Principles provide that indigenous law is subject to
the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3,53 and Section 33(2) of the Constitution
further provides that "no law, whether a rule of the common law, customary law or
legislation, shall limit any right entrenched in this Chapter,"' it is important to ascer-
tain if the provisions of customary law are in conflict with the fundamental rights
contained in Chapter 3.
One of the most often emphasized rights contained in the Chapter is the right of
freedom from discrimination based inter alia on gender. This right is set forth in Sec-
tion 8(2) of the Constitution, and the Constitution goes on to provide for affirmative
action for "groups or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination." '
Gender equality seems to have been a primary concern of the framers of the Constitu-
tion. It is referred to three times in the Constitutional Principles,56 and a Commission
on Gender Equality has been created by Section 119(1) of the Constitution to promote
gender equality and make recommendations to Parliament with regard to "any laws :..
which affect gender equality and the status of women."'57 This emphasis on the pro-
motion of gender equality in the new South Africa is appropriate given South Africa's
history as a sexist as well as racist society." Pressure from women's groups, most
notably the Women's League of the A.N.C., has pushed gender issues into the fore-
front of legal reform. The efforts of the Federation of African Women have also
served to keep the focus on the issue of gender discrimination and its prevalence in
customary law.
The position of women subject to customary law has become an extremely sensi-
tive topic in recent times. Prior to embarking on this discussion of women under cus-
tomary law, it should be noted that legislation which came into effect in South Africa
in 1988 has sought, to some extent, to ameliorate the position of women subject to
customary law.59 However, in light of Sanders' comment, which essentially states that
"command law" cannot change the nature of African law,' it seems appropriate to set
51. S. AFR. CONST. § 28(1).
52. S. AFR. CONST. § 31.
53. S. AFR. CONST. sched. 4. art. XII.
54. S. AFR. CONST. § 33(2).
55. S. AFR. CONST. § 8(3)(a).
56. S. AFR. CONST. sched. 4, arts. I, III, V.
57. S. AFR. CONST. § 119(3).
58. The common law legal system in South Africa, Roman Dutch law, sanctioned discrimination
on the basis of gender. One example of this is the fact that a married woman was, until recently,
considered a minor in the law.
59. Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, 5 Juta's Stat. of S. Afr. 2-141 (1993) (incorporating
Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988) [hereinafter Matrimonial Property
Act]. The legislation has attempted to accomplish this by providing that black women who many after
October, 1988, whether in accordance with civil law or customary law, shall be deemed to be married
in community of property. The legislation also purports to abolish the "marital power" of the husband,
thereby freeing black women from perpetual tutelage.
60. Sanders, supra note 42. If one looks at the example of the homeland of Transkei, where
legislation was enacted purporting to abolish the minority status of women and making twenty-one the
1995]
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forth the position of women prior to 1988.
VI. THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW
The position of women in African customary law could be generally character-
ized as being that of a perpetual minor subject to the guardianship and authority of her
husband, if married, or her father.6' A.C. Myburgh notes that there were some excep-
tions to this general rule,62 but as these had been accomplished through prior colonial
legislation, they will not be treated as significant for the purpose of this discussion.
As a result of her minority status within the community, a woman could not
bring an action in her own name or be sued in her own name. Indeed, Emmet V. Mit-
tiebeeler notes that it was common practice in pre-independence Zimbabwe when a
woman was charged with a crime, at least until the 1960s,63 to charge her husband
jointly with the same crime." The rationale behind such practice was that it was in-
conceivable that a woman would be acting of her own volition, without being coerced
or directed by her husband. The inability of a woman to sue in her own name was
reflected in the practice of a woman's father bringing an action for damages for the
seduction of his daughter.' If any damages were awarded, they accrued to the father
rather than to the woman herself.'
The position of a woman with regard to marriage was also somewhat circum-
scribed. It is debatable exactly how important the consent of the woman was to the
marriage. 7 Previous to 1967, the bride's actual consent was not required, but this
situation was changed by legislation, at least in the Natal Province." Acquiescence
(i.e. lack of visible protest), rather than actual consent, is probably accepted in practice
today. 6
9
African customary law generally does not consider a marriage wholly valid until
the lobolo or "bride price" has been paid in full to the woman's father by the prospec-
tive husband."° Sometimes the marriage is even delayed until the lobolo has been
paid, which may take a number of years.7' This lobolo is given to the bride's family
partly in return for the transfer of their authority over the woman to her husband's
age of majority for women, there has been little practical effect on the actual position of women.
Women are still treated by their families/husbands as if they were minors.
61. See CHERYL WALKER, WOMEN AND RESISTANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA (1982).
62. A.C. MYBURGH, PAPERS ON INDIGENOUS LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 79 et seq. (1990). My-
burgh notes that in terms of legislation promulgated in Natal Province, South Africa, a spinster, widow
or divorced woman may under certain circumstances be vested with the powers of a kraal head and
treated as a major. See Proclamation No. R195, § 28 (1967) (Natal Province) [hereinafter Proclama-
tion].
63. This was the case in Rhodesia under white rule. Such a rule is no longer applied in Zimba-
bwe.
64. EMMEI V. MITnLEBEELER, AFRICAN CUSTOM AND WESTERN LAW 96 (1976).
65. T.W. BENNETT, A SOURCEBOOK OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 248 (1991).
66. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 48.
67. Id. at 85 (indicating that in practice the woman's consent was not necessary in that the lack
of her consent was not considered a bar to the marriage).
68. Proclamation, supra note 62, § 1959 (requiring the bride to publicly declare that she freely
consents to the marriage).
69. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 86.
70. Id. at 83-84. If a couple lives together and has children prior to full payment of the lobolo,
the wife's family may take custody of the children until the full amount of the lobolo has been paid.
71. Id. at 83.
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family. The lobolo has traditionally consisted of the payment of five head of cattle,72
but as an adaptation to modern conditions, their commercial value in money or in the
form of other material goods is becoming accepted.73 Should the marriage dissolve,
and the woman return to her family, the lobolo, or a portion thereof, must generally be
returned. However, allowances are made if the couple has children.74
Myburgh notes that at the marriage ceremony a woman is often shown a
sjambok (a stiff whip) to signify her husband's authority and his right of chastisement
over her." The right of chastisement of a man over his wife during the period of the
marriage is not merely symbolic. 6 A husband may physically discipline and chastise
his wife for relatively minor infringements.77
The authority of the husband over his wife extends to members of the husband's
agnatic group,7" and the woman's father and family retain some authority over her as
well.7 If a woman's husband should die, the members of his family group can con-
tinue to assert their authority over the woman, requiring her inter alia to "till the soil,"
as well as cook." One aspect of this authority is the ight to require the woman to
make her reproductive services available to a certain member of the group and bear his
children; hence, the practice in some tribes of a deceased man's brother taking the
woman as his wife." The marriage, therefore, is not necessarily dissolved by the hus-
band's death, as the wife may be required to remain with her former husband's group
and bear children to a member of that group. 2
As a person subject to permanent guardianship in one form or another, a woman
may generally own no property in her own name. 3 All property acquired by her dur-
ing the marriage accrues to her husband." Several exceptions to this general principle
have developed, largely through colonial legislation,85 as well as the Matrimonial Pro-
72. This is the practice for both the Xhosa and Zulu tribes of South Africa.
73. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 84.
74. Under Xhosa law and tradition the wife's family may keep one head of cattle for each child
that has been born of the union. Since the custody of the children traditionally goes to the husband
on dissolution of the marriage, payment of lobolo represents a transfer of the authority over the chil-
dren to the husband's family.
75. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 79.
76. S.M. SEYMOUR, BANTU LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 134, 230 (1967). The right of "moderate
castigation" actually enhances the status of the male, as he is charged with exercising the group's
authority over his particular family. Id.
77. An example of this occurred at a trial I attended in the Regional Court of Transkei in 1987
(the case is unreported). A man was charged with culpable homicide (manslaughter) in the beating
death of his wife. The man's defense was that he had merely been exercising his customary law right
to physically chastise his wife for being rude to his parents. His wife died during the course of the
beating.
78. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 79.
79. Such authority can consist of the woman's family disciplining her for misbehaving towards
her husband's family group. See SEYMOUR, supra note 76, at 175. In addition, if a man misbehaves
towards his wife in the presence of her family, the woman's father can seek redress from the husband
for such behavior. See MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 85.
80. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 81.
81. Id.
82. All children conceived in this manner are considered to be children of the deceased, particu-
larly for purposes of succession. BENNETT, supra note 65, at 248.
83. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 78. In addition, Myburgh notes that marital guardianship entitles
the husband's agnatic group to the woman's earnings and her services, including her labor and her
reproductive activity. Id. at 112.
84. Id. at 78.
85. See, e.g., Proclamation, supra note 62, §§ 28, 33, 36, 42; see also MYBURGH, supra note 62,
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perty Act.8" The position may, de facto, be somewhat different for women as they
continue to move away from their families to the cities and enter the work force.
A woman subject to African customary law may also find herself in the position
of not being her husband's only wife, as polygamy is practiced among many tribes in
South Africa.87 Junior wives do not have the same status as senior wives and primo-
geniture is given effect, in that the first born son of the senior wife will usually be-
come head of the family group upon his father's death." Although the fertility of a
woman is not a requirement of a valid marriage, 9 the man may, in certain tribes, take
another unmarried member of his wife's family in marriage for the purpose of bearing
children (the so-called sororate union) should his wife be infertile.'
It is unclear at the present time what the exact impact of the Matrimonial Proper-
ty Act will be on many of the institutions and procedures of African customary law. It
is often the case that a couple will enter into a civil law marriage but still observe
customary law procedures and institutions such as lobolo. As the Act purports to abol-
ish the husband's marital power, it calls into question and perhaps undermines the
whole institution of lobolo,9' at least for those couples marrying under the civil law.
As lobolo signifies, to some extent, payment by the husband to the woman's family in
return for the transfer of their authority over her to the husband and his family, the
significance of this procedure is diminished and perhaps rendered unnecessary by the
abolition of the marital power.
It is unfortunate that this legislation, when adhered to, creates a situation where a
woman can ostensibly escape from the authority of her group and perpetual minority,
to some extent,92 through civil marriage. Yet, the situation of a woman who does not
marry, or who marries under customary law, remains unaddressed, as the woman will
apparently remain subject to the authority of her family group and her husband's
group.
Further, in providing that African women married under civil law will be deemed
to be married in community of property, the Act has the effect of altering the custom-
ary law provision that a woman may not hold property in her own name. However, the
position of a woman in a customary law union with regard to property rights remains
unaffected. The Act purports to give some recognition to customary law unions in that
it prohibits a man who is married under customary law from entering into a civil law
marriage.' The Act, thus, essentially provides that women married pursuant to cus-
tomary law will be excluded from the benefits of the civil law. Yet, several of its
provisions impact on institutions associated with customary law.
at 78. In the Zulu tribe, however, it is not unknown for a woman to own property. In addition, in an
urban setting a working woman is likely to own property.
86. Matrimonial Property Act, supra note 59.
87. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 83.
88. BENNETT, supra note 65, at 184.
89. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 86.
90. BENNETr, supra note 65, at 240.
91. This is so, because lobolo signifies, in part, the transfer of authority over a woman from her
father to her husband.
92. As was noted previously, a woman's family retains some authority over her, even if she is
married.
93. See Matrimonial Property Act, supra note 55, § 1. A black man who wishes to marry under
the civil law provisions must first declare that he is not already married under an existing customary
law union. Id.
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Such legislation which affects, whether incidentally or otherwise, certain aspects
of cultural life without taking the whole picture into consideration, often creates more
problems than it solves. This happens because it has the effect of rendering the posi-
tion of an African woman with regard to her rights and duties in her community even
more uncertain.' By doing so, it perhaps unintentionally undermines any grassroots
movement from within the black community that might be attempting to alleviate the
position of black women. It is difficult to focus on and address issues that are clouded
by uncertainty.
Although this description of the position of women subject to African customary
law does not purport to be a complete or exhaustive treatise on the matter, I believe
that one can derive some insight from it on how customary law pertains to and affects
women. The situation of women bound by these provisions should then be tested
against the articles contained in international human rights documents and the new Bill
of Rights to determine which right-gender equality or cultural rights-should be
afforded primacy.
VII. THE DEFICIENCIES OF THE CUSTOMARY LAW APPROACH TO
WOMEN
The nature of this enterprise is made more difficult by the fact that the commun-
itarian nature of African law implies that rights inure to the group or the community
rather than the individual. Thus, an attempt to determine whether a legal system, which
is not predicated on individual rights, violates the rights of certain individuals within
the community may be seen to be inherently contradictory. It further smacks of the
western bias that African countries often assert. Yet, it is a valid enterprise and a valid
approach for the following reasons:
1. Certain of the rights which attach to the group in African culture find
expression through individuals, who represent such rights on behalf of the group.
The fact that only certain individuals can represent particular rights on behalf of
the group and that gender plays a role in determining who gets to represent those
rights is significant for the purpose of this study.
2. Due in part to the influence of colonial law, some individual rights are
recognized by customary law."
3. The very people who endorse the values of African tradition and civiliza-
tion have also seen fit to incorporate individual-based, westernized rights and duties
into their legal systems, both in the guise of Bills of Rights and through their ratifi-
cation of international documents which assert such individual rights. By recogniz-
ing rights that inure to the individual rather than the community, and incorporating
those rights into the legal framework, the leaders of new African governments have
opened themselves and their legal systems up to criticisms based on a western con-
cept of law that they often disclaim.
The position of women in society vis-a-vis these points will now be examined below.
One may derive some insight into the position of women by examining which
individuals under African customary law may represent rights on behalf of the group.
94. It is not surprising that the practice of apartheid and the myriad laws created under the apart-
heid system that impacted adversely on black people have tended to make the black population wary
of the law.
95. MYBURGH, supra note 62. at 81.
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It is clear, from even a cursory examination of the situation, that the individuals who
represent such rights are usually men, most often the male head of the agnatic group.
Myburgh argues, however, that a woman's right to share in the personality of her
group is "apparent from her power to take an active part in steps to obtain redress
when she or a woman of her group is the victim of a delict such as seduction, or an
accusation of misconduct with her father-in-law."' The woman's so-called active
role, however, often amounts to being permitted to partake of the beast that is taken
from the wrongdoer and slaughtered.'
Myburgh further argues that a woman can exercise the group's authority in an-
other way, by offering herself in marriage to the member of another group.98 He adds
the rider, however, that such an offer of marriage must be made with the consent and
approval of the woman's group, which seems to negate the argument that such action
is indicative of any authority on the part of the woman.
Myburgh's arguments in this regard seem to be reinforced by the studies of Sey-
mour,99 who concurs with Myburgh that a woman is not excluded from participating
in the joint personality of the group or from exercising certain rights pursuant to such
participation. The rights that a woman can exercise, however, are closely circumscribed
and limited to the situations described above. Myburgh acknowledges that a group
member's right to participate in the rights of the group "corresponds ... to his or her
competencies.""ua These "competencies" depend on "the factors by which persons are
placed in different status classes, viz mental and physical maturity, sex, marriage and
rank."'01 Myburgh cites several examples of different rights being vested in various
members of the agnatic group. He notes, for example, that only a husband and no
other members of the group may take action for adultery in respect of his wife." A
man represents the group in respect of any actions concerning his particular family,
and it is the men that take the actual action in cases involving defloration.0 3 Women
may participate in such action in that they are permitted, because of their roles as kee-
pers of the virtue of the young girls, to partake of the beast that is taken from the
perpetrator as reparation for a seduction."
When one considers the different ways in which various mature adult members
of the group participate in, and represent the rights of the group, it is clear that, aside
from the question of an individual's maturity (i.e. majority), an individual's sex is the
deciding factor in allocating the representation of rights. By virtue of their gender,
women are denied the possibility of representing the group rights in many areas. It
appears, arguably, that the agnatic head of the group may be the only individual who
could properly be described as having full personality rights or, at least, full represen-
tative rights. A woman, again on the basis of gender, is generally barred from becom-
ing head of the agnatic group in most African tribes."l Women are thus, arguably,
96. Id. at 79.
97. SEYMOUR, supra note 76, at I 1I.
98. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 79.
99. SEYMOUR, supra note 76, at xix, 330-332.
100. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 78.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 48.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 79.
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denied the expression of full rights of personality. Aside from the issue of full person-
ality rights, the position of women cannot be said to be one where full respect for their
dignity as human beings is honored. As is evidenced by the earlier description, women
are subject to physical chastisement and perpetual guardianship in one form or another
on the basis of their gender. A woman's participation in the group is at the level of a
subordinate. Such treatment does not evidence a community where women are accord-
ed the opportunity to develop fully as human beings and appears to clearly contravene
the provisions of Section 8(2) of the new Constitution.
The exclusion of women from personality rights, as well as the opportunity for
full development, is also found in those instances where customary law has adopted
the notion of individual rights. As noted above, these rights have become part of the
body of customary law largely through legislation created by a white government.
Nevertheless, it is significant to note that this legislation tends to bear out the apparent
customary law tradition of only according males full rights. Examples of such legisla-
tion include Section 27 of Proclamation No. R195 from 1967 which applies only to the
Natal Province, and which provides that males shall be considered majors on attaining
the age of twenty-one (21)." This violates both international principles and the Con-
stitutional principle of equality before the law."° It should be noted that Section 38
of the same Proclamation provides that a man will still remain subject to the kraal
head in all matters relating to the kraal."°a In certain cases individual rights have been
granted to divorced or emancipated women through legislation."l It is not clear in
practice how the concept of emancipation is accepted and acted upon in African societ-
ies. M'D'Sa notes that exclusion from the community, which is what emancipation
effectively accomplishes, is usually considered the most severe punishment."' Thus,
the practice of emancipation is probably limited to instances where the community no
longer desires the woman to be part of its group."' In such cases it could be argued
that the full personality rights that a woman may receive on emancipation are not ac-
corded to her out of respect for her dignity as a human being.
As noted above, African society tends to place more emphasis on the community
than the individual. This approach results in variations in the way that concepts such as
rights and freedoms are applied. As M'D'Sa puts it, "although the struggle for human
dignity remains universal, it may be argued that the African people have to respond to
these challenges in their own way.""' M'D'Sa's argument, which appears to be a re-
statement of the theory that human rights may be culturally diverse, is not borne out in
practice. The fact that African societies continue to ratify international documents
which couch rights ii terms of individual, rather than group, rights and indeed couch
their own rights-related documents in such terms, belies the cultural diversity argu-
ment. While not denying the validity of M'D'Sa's approach, I would argue that the
fact that African societies accept the concept of "the struggle for human dignity," as
106. Proclamation, supra note 62, § 27.
107. S. AFR. CONST. § 8(2).
108. Proclamation, supra note 62, § 38; see also MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 79.
109. See Proclamation, supra note 62, §§ 28, 42.
110. M'D'Sa, supra note 30, at 77.
111. In Zimbabwe, the Age of Majority Act of 1981 has sought to emancipate women with limited
success. Women do not want to claim emancipation because they are then excluded from their com-
munity.
112. M'D'Sa, supra note 30, at 74.
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defined in international documents such as the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the U.N. Char-
ter,"3 imposes on them a certain obligation to ensure its respect, despite cultural dif-
ferences. The dignity of women is not being accorded respect by African customary
law, as long as they are barred from fully participating in the group. This approach
could be said to have been accepted by the A.N.C., who has proclaimed their support
of women's rights, " 4 and their commitment to the elimination of discrimination
against women.
The notion of dignity carries some connotations of an equality of respect in that,
as Weinreb puts it, "every person who is a member of a community ... is to be treat-
ed as a person, neither more nor less."'"5 It is clear that under African customary
law, a woman's position within the community is not on par with a man's position and
that on the basis of her sex she is treated as somewhat less than a person. Myburgh
notes that marriage enhances a man's status in that he becomes responsible for the
affairs pertaining to his family." 6 While a married woman may be accorded more
token respect than an unmarried one, her actual position and status cannot be said to
have been elevated. Indeed, in light of the fact that she is subject to being physically
chastised by her husband and subject to the additional authority of her husband's
group, as well as that of her own group, it would not be an overstatement to say that
her situation has deteriorated.
Not only is it patently clear to those who have been schooled in a western tradi-
tion of law that the provisions which place women in such a position are unacceptable,
this assessment is further concurred with by women who have been raised under the
African tradition of law. The Woman's Federation of South Africa, a multiracial group
with many black members, opposed the maintenance of customary law as a valid legal
system on the grounds that it discriminated against women."" Moreover, Article 8 of
the Final Resolution of the All Africa Law Conference held in Swaziland in October,
1981, provided that "[a]ny rule, institution or custom which degrades a woman or fails
to accord her the fundamental rights belonging to every individual is repugnant to
justice.""' In particular, the Conference called attention to the injustice of indigenous
and received laws which deny women equality of recognition and treatment in the field
of marriage and property rights.
If one examines the position of women subject to African customary law against
a natural law framework, it becomes clear that certain provisions of African customary
law are unacceptable, because they do not afford the individual true recognition of, or
respect for, her dignity as a human being. The individual is therefore denied the full
113. It should be noted that the present South African Government has not ratified these two cove-
nants, although it has ratified the U.N. Charter. It is expected, however, that a future South African
government will ratify these documents together with the Banjul Charter.
114. The A.N.C. made this a non-negotiable point in negotiations for a new Constitution for South
Africa. Their commitment to the principle is reflected in the Constitution and in the creation of a new
Ministry of Women's Affairs in Nelson Mandela's government.
115. LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 167 (1987).
116. MYBURGH, supra note 62, at 81.
117. See The Charter of the Women's Federation (FedSAW) (clause entitled "Equality For Women"
which provides that the members of FedSAW will struggle for the removal of laws and customs that
deny African women the right to own property and which seeks to enforce upon them the status of a
minor) [hereinafter FedSAW Charter].
118. See Conference Report, 25 J. AFR. L. 59 (1981).
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opportunity to develop within her community. This is contrary to the principles under-
lying natural law, as well as a deontologically based approach to human rights. John
Finnis argues that the "vice of discrimination" which is marked by "group bias, [and]
denial of equal concern and respect" evidences a "failure of distributive justice.""' 9
Natural law is predicated on a belief, as Finnis submits, "that every human being is a
locus of human flourishing which is to be considered with favor in him (sic) as much
as in any one else."" ° Weinreb concurs in noting that, "The most general basis for a
substantive principle of equality among human beings is simply their humanity. All
people ought to be treated alike in some respects, . . . because they have specifically
human characteristics in common."'' The equality that Weinreb and Finnis refer to,
and which is demanded by distributive justice, is apparently an equality of respect or
concern. As Rodes puts it, "[d]istributive justice calls for an equal allocation among
the members of the community of the benefits and burdens of those projects which the
community undertakes."'" It would appear that African women have more than their
fair share of the burdens and substantially less of the benefits.
Weinreb's and Finnis' formulations are consistent with one of the earliest charac-
terizations of natural law offered by Cicero in De Republica."2 Cicero argued that
natural law was of "universal application"'2" and that one should not look outside of
oneself for "an expounder or interpreter of it,"" as there is no human being who
"cannot attain to virtue."'" The fact that each individual was seen as capable of ac-
knowledging and interpreting the law of nature for himself or herself, and aspiring to
virtue through such interpretation, indicates that natural law is predicated on the princi-
ple that each individual should be afforded equal opportunity to develop as a human
being. This is shown in Cicero's belief that "no single thing is so like one another, so
exactly its counterpart as all of us are to one another."" Based on our common hu-
manity, Cicero argued that "we are so constituted by Nature as to share the sense of
justice with one another' ' " (i.e., an awareness of the need for distributive justice
based on an acknowledgment of the equality of each person's ultimate worth). Weinreb
concludes that "universal natural law left no room for the ... inequality of per-
sons."
129
It may be argued that it is unfair to assess the practices of African customary law
against a natural law framework which is essentially, once again, of western origin.
However, the fact that natural law theories may have originated in the west does not
make them less valid. Moreover, there are some marked similarities between the soci-
ety within which Roman law operated at the time of Cicero, and the society within
which African customary law operates today. This is particularly true if one considers
the fact that both societies were/are patriarchal and founded on the agnatic group. Both
119. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 223 (1980).
120. Id. at 221.
121. WEINREB, supra note 115, at 167.
122. ROBERT E. RODES JR., THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE 159 (1976).
123. MARCUS CICERO, DE REPUBLICA, bk. III.
124. Id. at 32.
125. Id.
126. MARCUS CICERO, DE LEGIBUS, bk. I, at 30.
127. Id. at 29.
128. Id.
129. WEINREB, supra note 115, at 43.
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strongly emphasized the role and importance of custom. In fact, Cicero even ques-
tioned the "worth of human life," unless it was "woven into the lives of our ancestors
by the records of history.""' Further, both societies found themselves in a state of
transition, coming into contact with other cultures, and being forced to question the
position of women within their respective communities.' Thus, considering the ori-
gins of natural law, to examine the way in which African customary law affects wom-
en against a natural law framework, is not entirely inappropriate.
Moreover, as argued above, African customary law and its adherents have ac-
cepted some rights terminology into their legal framework. As Finnis notes, modem
usage of claims of right are consistent with a natural law tradition, as "not only does
rights-talk keep justice in the foreground of our considerations," but it also provides "a
usefully detailed listing of the various aspects of human flourishing and fundamental
components of the way of life in community that tends to favour such flourishing in
all.,,1
32
Whether one assesses customary law against human rights instruments, which
emphasize the concept of the dignity of the individual, or against natural law, which
espouses the principle of giving everyone his or her due, 3 3 it is clear that customary
law comes up short when it comes to affording women the opportunity to develop
fully within their society. Finnis argues for a "conception of human good, according to
which a person is entitled to equal concern and respect."'" He further makes the
point that "a community is in bad shape in which that entitlement is denied."'35 The
fact that many African societies are inadequate in this area has not gone unnoticed by
the societies themselves." This would appear to bear out Margaret Mead's observa-
tion that when two cultures come into contact they tend to extract from one another
those features which are most conducive to the development of human dignity. 37
VIII. WILL SOUTH AFRICA FAVOR GENDER EQUALITY OVER
CUSTOMARY LAW?
It is clear that the framers of the Constitution anticipated that customary law,
which discriminates against women, as argued below, would have to bend to those
provisions of the Constitution which prohibit gender discrimination. This is illustrated
by the fact that Article 181(2) provides that "indigenous law shall be subject to regula-
tion by law,"' 38 and that Article 33(2) provides that no law shall limit any of the fun-
damental rights contained in Chapter three. 39 Moreover, the Commission on Gender
130. Id.
131. See CICERO, supra note 123, at 17. Cicero decries the Voconian Law, which was a law re-
stricting the amount of money that a woman could receive through inheritance. Id. Cicero noted in
respect of this law: "that law, passed for men's advantage, is full of injustice to women." id Similar-
ly, in the Preamble to the Charter of the Federation of South African Women, it is noted that the
"status of women is a test of civilization." See Fedsaw Charter, supra note 117, preamble.
132. FINNIS, supra note 119, at 221-222.
133. Id. at 223 (concurring with the writings of Plato, Cicero and St. Augustine).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
137. MARGARET MEAD, NEW LIvEs FOR OLD (1956).
138. S. AFR. CONST. § 181(2).
139. S. AFR. CONST. § 33(2). The history behind the anti-gender discrimination clauses also bears
this out. The A.N.C. Women's League struck a deal with the Executive Committee of the A.N.C. at
the party's convention in July, 1991. The terms provided that the A.N.C. promise to make gender
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Equality has been charged with making recommendations to Parliament on laws which
affect gender equality and the status of women.'" The problem is that Article 8(2)
also preserves the right to one's culture, in providing that there shall be no discrimina-
tion on the basis of culture."" The framers of the Constitution apparently did not
contemplate there being a conflict between the right to freedom from discrimination
based on gender, and freedom from discrimination based on culture.
If one examines Article 33(2) carefully, it provides that not one of the fundamen-
tal rights may be limited by any law. 42 This terminology encompasses the right not
to have one's culture, and arguably one's customary law system, limited by any legis-
lation. Thus, it appears that even if it is determined that customary law contravenes the
Constitution by discriminating against women, arguably no change may be made to
customary law, because to do so would be to contravene the rights of customary law
adherents to their culture.
Customary law adherents may even claim that their legal system does not unfair-
ly discriminate"" against women, because it is not predicated on the individual but
on the community. Since it is the community or group that is important and not the
individual, the fact that women do not bear the rights on behalf of the group is more
incidental and not "unfair." The rights of women are protected by their membership in
the group. However, because of the recent emphasis placed on women's rights and
gender equality it is unlikely that this argument would be successful. This is particular-
ly true because the present government is loath to place too much emphasis on cultural
rights for fear that this will lead to demands for secession by groups like Inkatha, the
Zulu Nationalist party, and because the legitimacy of freedom from gender discrimina-
tion has at last been acknowledged in South Africa.
The problem of determining which rights should be accorded preference is com-
pounded by the affirmative action provisions of the Bill of Rights and the reference to
interpreting the Chapter in accordance with international law and foreign case law.
Given that customary law adherents have seen their law interfered with and corrupted
by both the colonial and apartheid governments, an argument could be made that cus-
tomary law adherents fall under the provisions of Article 8(3)(a). This Article, the
affirmative action clause, applies to groups "disadvantaged by unfair discrimina-
tion."'" One could well take the position that by subjecting customary law to the re-
pugnancy clause,4 and by limiting the jurisdiction of the chiefs and tribal courts, the
colonial and apartheid governments unfairly discriminated against customary law ad-
herents as a group. Arguably, proponents of customary law would now be entitled to
special protection and advancement as a group, thereby enabling them to keep their
system of customary law intact. It is my opinion that, should this argument be ad-
equality a non-negotiable item in the negotiations for the new Constitution.
140. S. AFR. CONST. § 119(3).
141. S. AFR. CONST. § 8(2).
142. S. AFR. CONST. § 33(2).
143. S. AFR. CONST. § 8(2) (stating explicitly that "[n]o person shall be unfairly discriminated
against . ." and implying that some forms of discrimination may not be unfair).
144. S. AFR. CONST. § 8(3)(a).
145. The repugnancy clause was a principle used by colonial governments to guide them in limit-
ing the recognition of customary law. Basically, it provided that customary law would be recognized in
transactions between blacks as long as it was not contrary to natural justice or repugnant to morality.
The use of the repugnancy clause resulted in customary law being reinterpreted by colonial rulers.
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vanced, it would fail on the grounds of legislative intent,"4 in that it was the intent
of the framers of the Constitution to prohibit gender discrimination, no matter what its
form. The problem is compounded, however, if South Africa looks to international law
or foreign case law on this topic.
Article 35(1) of the Constitution provides that a court may give regard to public
international law and comparable foreign case law in interpreting the rights contained
in the Bill of Rights. 47 As argued above, public international law has not itself clear-
ly resolved the conflict between cultural rights and women's rights. A clear statement
favoring women's rights over cultural rights was only made recently in the Convention
for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).' 4
Article 5 of the Convention provides that State Parties shall take all appropriate
measures:
(a) to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women,
with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.49
The Convention also calls on states to accord all women equality before the law,"
including full locus standi.' Member states are further encouraged to take appropri-
ate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters related to mar-
riage and family relations.' It is significant to note that, despite the fact that
CEDAW entered into force some five years prior to the Banjul Charter,' the draft-
ers of the Banjul Charter did not incorporate CEDAW's provisions about eliminating
customary practices which discriminate against women.
IX. EXAMPLES PROVIDED BY FOREIGN CASE LAW
Pursuant to section 35(1) of the Constitution, the courts may consider foreign
case law, as well as, international law when interpreting the rights set forth in Chapter
Three of the Constitution. Thus, South Africa may look to her neighbors for a lead.
The problem is not only that international law is confusing but that foreign case law
does not seem to provide any clearer precedent. The recent Otieno case"' in Kenya
and the Unity Dow case'55 in Botswana illustrate that other African states have expe-
rienced problems in resolving the conflict between cultural rights and women's rights.
In the Otieno case, the wife of S.M. Otieno, a prominent Kenyan lawyer, who
died in 1986, sought to bury her husband's body near where they had spent their mar-
146. H. R. HAHLO & ELLISON KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS HISTORY 365
(1968) (legislative intent is a permissible manner of interpreting statutes under South African law).
147. S. AR. CONST. § 35(1).
148. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. GAOR,
34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N. Doc. A134/36 (1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
33 (1980) (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
149. Id. art. 5.
150. Id. art. 15(1).
151. Id. art. 15(2), (3).
152. Id. art. 16(1).
153. The Banjul Charter entered into force on October 21, 1986.
154. See John W. Van Doren, Death African Style: The Case of S.M. Otieno, 36 AM. J. COMP. L.
329 (1988).
155. Attorney General v. Unity Dow, Civ. App. No. 4/91 (Bots. App. Ct. June 3, 1992) (opinion
of Ammissah, J.P.).
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ried life together." Her late husband's brother, a prominent member of the Luo
Clan, sought to have Otieno's body buried near the ancestral home. As the place and
manner of burial is extremely important in African customary law, Otieno's brother
had the support of an active Luo Clan organization. The case was a clear illustration of
the clash between women's rights and cultural rights. While the Kenyan Constitution
contains clauses which prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender, the customary
law of succession requires that the deceased be buried by his male relatives. The Court
of Appeals essentially found that there was an exception to the anti-gender discrimi-
nation clauses of the Constitution where the customary law of burial was con-
cerned.'57 It, therefore, found that Otieno's brother had the right to bury Otieno, de-
spite the fact that Otieno was not an adherent of customary law and had chosen to
marry his wife in a civil law ceremony, rather than according to customary law. Cus-
tomary law rights were thus preferred over gender discrimination claims in this case.
In the Botswana case of Attorney General v. Unity Dow,' claims based on
gender discrimination were not as easily dismissed as in the Otieno case, and the rul-
ing of the Appeals Court advanced the cause of women's rights. Despite this ruling,
the fact that many gender discriminatory laws remain in Botswana is disquieting.'59
In Unity Dow, a Botswana attorney brought a gender discrimination claim based on the
fact that the Botswana Citizenship Act grants citizenship to children of Botswana men
who are married to non-citizens but not to children of women married to non-Botswa-
na citizens."W Although the Botswana High Court upheld Dow's claim, the Deputy
Attorney General made the logical argument that the state sanctions sexual bias, be-
cause it permits other discriminatory laws to exist in the form of customary law. Dur-
ing the appeal, the Deputy Attorney General argued that the people of Botswana were
entitled to determine their own norms, which did not have to include, and traditionally
did not include, gender equality.'" He further argued that the fact that customary
law, although apparently discriminatory, is still adhered to by a large number of the
population, and is sanctioned by the state as a valid legal system, indicates that the
state condones and supports gender discrimination. Although the Appeals Court ul-
timately found in favor of Unity Dow in holding the Citizenship Act to be unconstitu-
tional, the Court stressed that the judgment did not mean that other discriminatory laws
were necessarily unconstitutional."
156. Van Doren, supra note 154, at 338.
157. Id. at 341-42.
158. Civ. App. No. 4/91.
159. See, e.g., Administration of Estates Act, Cap. 31.01, Para. 28(5) (permitting women to admin-
ister an estate only with the permission of their husband); Deeds Registry Act, Cap. 33.02, Para. 18(4)
(preventing immoveable property from being registered in the name of a woman married in community
of property); Unity Dow, Civ. App. No. 4/91, at 88 (stressing that the Court was only deciding the
issue of the validity of the Citizenship Act and not other acts which discriminated against women, and
that by finding the Citizenship Act unconstitutional it was not necessarily finding other discriminatory
acts unconstitutional).
160. See Michael P. Seng, In a Conflict Between Equal Rights for Women and Customary Law,
the Botswana Court of Appeal Chooses Equality, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 563, 568 (1993).
161. Nina Shapiro, Test Case: Bias Ruling May Lead to Challenging Other Laws, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
15, 1991, at A].
162. Id. It is estimated by the Botswana government that there are currently at least twenty-five
major statutes that condone gender discrimination. See Maureen O'Neil, African Women's Groups Gain
Strength, THE GAZETrE, Dec. 1, 1991, at B2.
163. Unity Dow, Civ. App. No. 4/91, at 88.
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A recent case in Zimbabwe, which has ostensibly committed itself to outlawing
gender discrimination against women, whether in the common law or customary law,
is also extremely troubling. The Chapusa case involved the customary law right of
chastisement of a husband over his wife. 1" Laimon Chapusa and his wife were out
drinking at a beer hall when Mr. Chapusa ordered his wife to return home to make
supper for their three children." His wife refused to comply with his order so Mr.
Chapusa struck her.1" They both returned home where the argument continued. 67
Mr. Chapusa repeatedly beat and struck his wife with a stick for her rudeness and
neglect of duties.'" Mrs. Chapusa died from the injuries that she suffered.1" Mr.
Chapusa pled guilty to culpable homicide in her death but was sentenced to a fine of
only $250.17 The judge was apparently sympathetic to Mr. Chapusa's mitigating evi-
dence that his wife had been rude and neglected her duties and that Mr. Chapusa sim-
ply exercised his marital authority in striking her.' This is not the only Zimbabwean
case where judges have shown themselves to be sympathetic to the position of custom-
ary law adherents at the expense of women.
In the case of Jenah v. Nyembe 72 the Zimbabwean Supreme Court held that the
proprietary consequences of African marriages (i.e., marriages between two black peo-
ple) would be governed by African customary law, regardless of whether the parties
marry under the African Marriages Act (customary law) or the Marriage Act (civil
law)."" Under customary law, all property acquired by a woman during the marriage
accrues to her husband, with the exception of property owned by the women for purely
ceremonial purposes. In effect, the courts are giving legal sanction to a property sys-
tem that is inherently unfair to women. Although this situation has been redressed to
some extent by the Matrimonial Causes Act, which provides that a court may order
an equitable distribution of property between the spouses on dissolution of mar-
riage, "' 5 the position of a woman is not protected during the marriage; she is essen-
tially deemed to be without property interests. This approach undermines any commit-
ment to uphold the rights of women and does not provide an example to South Africa
of how to advance women's rights.
The problems confronting African countries which are trying to eliminate dis-
crimination against women while preserving a system of customary law are numerous.
The difficulties are compounded by the fact that the approach often taken smacks som-
ewhat of the colonial law approach, which recognized customary law in certain areas,
provided it was not "repugnant to justice."'76 Moreover, judges in many African coun-
164. See Vicki Finkel, Zimbabwe: What is a Woman's Life Worth: Just $125 in Court, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 27, 1989.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. The fine was $250 Zimbabwean dollars, approximately worth $125 U.S. dollars at the
time.
171. Id. The judge determined that the wife had been "asking for trouble in behaving as she did."
Id.
172. SC 49/86 (Zimb. 1986).
173. Id. at 3 (opinion of Justice Gubbay).
174. Matrimonial Causes Act, No. 33 (1985).
175. Id. § 7(l)(a).
176. See Chiduku v. Chidano, 1922 SR 55 (holding that "ft]he only question is whether the cus-
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tries do not come from legal traditions which have advanced or upheld women's rights.
Therefore, education, both of judges and customary law adherents, is required.
X. THE FUTURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa faces many of the same problems as Zimbabwe regarding societal
resistance to change. The vast majority of South African judges are white males, raised
in a legal tradition which, like customary law, has been slow in affording women equal
recognition.'" A sensitivity, both to women's issues and to customary law, is neces-
sary for women's rights to be advanced and upheld, as well as for the rights of cus-
tomary law adherents to their legal system to be recognized. Neither of these character-
istics has been displayed by the South African judiciary in the past. The situation will
require judges to be trained in customary law to ensure that the system is disrupted
only minimally when gender equality is enforced. Despite training judges in this area,
it is debatable whether adherents of customary law will observe new legislation and
judicial pronouncements aimed at ensuring gender equality.' Education and an
awareness of gender related issues will have to be fostered in customary law adherents
in order for customary law to be rid of gender discrimination.
Whether customary law can successfully make the transition to a modem society
is unclear. Much readjustment is required. It is also unclear whether customary law
will have much application in the modem world outside the sphere of family law and
land tenure. It could be argued that customary law's emphasis on reconciliation could
be of great benefit to an emerging South African society, if it could successfully make
the transition into the general legal system. One of the problems, as Margaret Mead
has noted in her anthropological studies, is that societies who are forced to incorporate
some foreign provisions of a socio/legal system often undermine the credibility of their
own system. Mead finds that such societies often abandon their own culture and,
instead, adopt the new system in its totality."W
The integration of customary law into a post-apartheid legal system requires a
delicate balancing act. The legitimate interests of a community in preserving and deter-
mining their own standards must be counterbalanced by the compelling interests of
women in being afforded the opportunity to develop in society without invidious legal
restrictions based on gender. A customary law that has been forced to assimilate anti-
gender discrimination norms into its legal system, because of civil law legislation, can
no longer be said to necessarily represent the norms and mores of its adherents, unless
they voluntarily make gender equality one of their new mores. A spirit of tolerance, an
emphasis on education, and time are necessary for the recognition of the valid aspira-
tions of women to be assimilated into this tribal society. Perhaps the emphasis on
problem solving through reconciliation, which is one of the most attractive features of
customary law, will be its saving grace. If women are able to communicate their aspi-
torn ... is repugnant to natural justice or morality ... whatever those words mean").
177. Until .1984 and the advent of the Matrimonial Affairs Act, married South African women were
still regarded as minors by the law and were subject to their husbands' marital power.
178. Brenda Grant & Pamela Schwikkard, Peoples Courts?, 7 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 307 (1991)
(suggesting that judgments of the colonial courts were often disregarded by adherents of customary
law, because they were seen as having no legitimacy and often did not accord with customary law
principles).
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rations to their society, and that society, in the spirit of reconciliation, is able to adjust
its traditions and institutions to acknowledge those aspirations, cultural rights and
women's rights may be reconciled. As William Godwin so aptly put it, "Every com-
munity of men, as well as every individual, must govern itself according to its ideas of
justice. What I should desire is not by violence to change its institutions, but by reason
to change its ideas."' 1
181. MrrrLEBEELER, supra note 64, at I (quoting Godwin).
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